Main Page / Special Project / Aircraft accident at Hong Kong International Airport in 1999

Background, Rescue Operation, Feeling (form Chief Staff Officer of AMS)

At around 6:45pm on 22 August 1999,  there was a aircraft accident at Hong Kong International Airport.

Around the time of the accident, The No. 8 Northwest Gale or Storm Signal was hoisted by the Hong Kong Observatory. So, a warning to pilots to expect significant windshear and severe turbulence on the approach and departure was included in the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) broadcasts prior to and at the time of the accident. For the safety, The Airport Authority, Hong Kong had closed the North Runway.

China Airlines flight CAL 642 was a scheduled passenger flight from Bangkok to Hong Kong with an estimated time of arrival of 1838 hours (hr). Because of the adverse forecast weather in Hong Kong, extra fuel in addition to that required was carried. This would provide several options to the crewfor diversion should the weather in Hong Kong preclude a landing. As a result, the planned aeroplane weight on arrival was very close to the maximum permitted landing weight. 

The departure and cruise phases of the flight were uneventful and, before commencing descent into Hong Kong, the flight crew obtained the current weather conditions from the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS), i.e. information 'X-Ray', issued at 1806 hr. This included a mean surface wind of 300 degrees at 35 knots and a runway visual range (RVR) of 650 metres in heavy rain. The Commander then briefed the First Officer for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to Runway 25L, for which the Commander would be the handling pilot. He later remarked that he would land subject to a wind check on final approach. The pilots had determined the landing reference speed (Vref) as 152 knots, and selected a target approach speed of 170 knots in view of the expected strong wind and turbulence on final approach.

On establishing radio contact with Hong Kong Approach Control, the crew were given radar vectors to intercept the ILS approach to Runway 25L.

1838 hr, about 14 nautical miles from touchdown, the aeroplane was transferred to Hong Kong Tower which told the crew to continue the approach. 

At 1841 hr, the crew were given a visibility in the touchdown zone of 1600 metres and a wind direction from 320 degrees at 25 knots, gusting to 33 knots, and the aeroplane was then cleared to land on Runway 25L. The crew advised 'runway in sight' at around 700 feet above touchdown and were given a further wind check of 320 degrees at 28 knots, gusting to 36 knots.

After becoming visual with the runway, the Commander disconnected the autopilot but left the autothrottle system still engaged. The aeroplane then continued to track the extended centreline, but descended and stabilised slightly low on the glideslope. At around 50 feet above the runway, coincident with the reduction of power to flight idle by the autothrottle system and the increase in pitch attitude, the indicated airspeed reduced from 170 knots to 152 knots immediately before touchdown.

Although an attempt was made to flare the aeroplane in a slightly right wing down attitude (less than 4 degrees), the sink rate was maintained and the aeroplane made a hard landing at 1844 hr. Its right main wheels contacted the runway first and the touchdown was made inside the touchdown zone on the runway centreline. The underside of the right engine cowling then impacted the runway and there was an outbreak of fire followed by the detachment of the right wing. The left wing which remained intact then lifted up and the aeroplane commenced a roll and yaw to the right, which could not be corrected, and ended up in an inverted, reversed position on a grass area just to the right of the runway, some 1100 metres from the threshold. The duty Tower Controller activated the crash alarm immediately to call out the Airport Fire Contingent.

Background, Rescue Operation, Feeling (form Chief Staff Officer of AMS)